Much Talk of Shared Danger But States Are Split on How to Respond

Source: Disarmament Times, 2005/4 pages 1-5

 View the voting record for all members of the Conference on Disarmament

Reaching Critical Will explanation of the resolutions and voting

The 60th General Assembly heard much talk of old and new dangers facing the world — especially the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possibility of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction — but States remained divided on what to do on key issues. Of the 55 resolutions that emerged from Assembly’s First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), 29 had to be voted upon. See this page for votes of members of the Conference on Disarmament. As in past years, nuclear issues proved the most controversial, accounting for nearly a third of the voted resolutions. Also in keeping with tradition, not a single resolution dealt with the arms industry which profits from global instability and conflict.

While everyone agreed on the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and their proliferation, committee debates made clear there was little agreement on how to deal with them. Most States saw the problems of proliferation and disarmament as interdependent aspects of one problem, but all five NPT Nuclear- Weapon States (Britain, China, France, Russian Federation, United States) tended to ignore or fudge that linkage. In noting the failures of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and of the General Assembly summit of 14-16 September — the former had no outcome document at all, and the latter could not agree to say anything on arms issues — each NWS pointed to what it considered positive elements in the international scene. The United States went so far as to say it did not “share the oft-expressed view that those meetings were failures.”

The difference in the basic approach of the United States and that of the Non- Aligned States emerged with some clarity.

The United States saw Cold War strategies of deterrence and arms control treaties as being of little value in a period when “rogue states,” dishonoring treaty commitments, could help non- State actors get and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To deal with that situation, flexible, non-treaty-based efforts were necessary to strengthen collective capacity to act rapidly. The US was working to strengthen export controls through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and to build cooperative capacity to interdict supplies through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), arrangements that had no formal treaty or organizational structure, but which had in a number of cases, stopped the shipment of missile-related material and equipment bound for “countries of concern, including Iran.”

In sharp contrast, the Non-Aligned countries saw the normative, non-discriminatory approach to international security as essential. Powerful States could not put their own welfare above those of others. In the equity and order of international law the Non-Aligned saw the only hope of security for weak States.

The United States encapsulated its approach in a radical redraft of a resolution that has for decades been adopted by consensus, on “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements.” It called on “all Member States to take concerted action to ensure that all States comply with their existing arms limitation, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for their non-compliance.” The draft did not mention international law or the United Nations Charter.

The great majority of States, including four of the five NWS, were uneasy with that language, and the resolution in its final form was significantly changed. It “calls upon all member states to take concerted action in a manner consistent with relevant international law to encourage, through bilateral and multilateral means, the compliance by all states with their respective non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other agreed obligations and to hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for their noncompliance in a manner consistent with the Charter of the UN.” Against the background of events in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, even that language caused heartburn; among those abstaining in the final vote were the Russian Federation, Egypt and South Africa.

Egypt had earlier decried the “desperate efforts” of NWS and their allies to “expand the obligations” of Non- Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) by applying “politicized and multiple standards” while they themselves ignored the multilateral frameworks within which issues could be best addressed. China, which was absent in the committee vote, noted during the thematic debate that security is best maintained through dialogue and “an integrated approach … to address both the symptoms and the root causes” of proliferation.

The three States that remain outside the NPT, India, Israel and Pakistan, spoke against proliferation, but with interesting contrasts. India said that disarmament and non-proliferation were “interlinked and mutually reinforcing;” the “growing threat of proliferation had to be dealt with in a manner that would facilitate and reinforce the process towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” It noted the comprehensive new legislation covering proliferation.

Israel said that “the conceptual and traditional association between progress in the fields of disarmament and nonproliferation has become irrelevant.” About its own nuclear capabilities, Israel maintained its traditional silence.

Pakistan emphasized that disarmament and non-proliferation were “two sides of the same coin.” Demands that it join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State were “unrealistic” it said; unless the global non-proliferation regime was reconciled with “nuclear reality” and its “institutional deficit” addressed, there was growing risk of a “cascade of proliferation.”

Iran and North Korea
Nuclear programs in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran were a cause of concern to a number of States. The promise of a completely denuclearized Korean peninsula in the Joint Statement issued after the 19 September “6-Party” talks in Beijing (North and South Korea, Japan, China, Russian Federation and the United States) were widely hailed. The DPRK, for its part, contended that its nuclear weapons program had been entirely in response to the threat posed by the United States, and that the joint statement “clearly specifies the obligations of the United States and south Korea, the responsible parties for the denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula.” Those obligations include providing the DPRK with a light-water reactor, removing nuclear threats and “hostile policies” against it, and “recognizing [its] rights to peaceful nuclear activities.”

Both the United States and the European Union called on Iran to live up to its obligations under the 2004 Paris Agreement to stop enrichment of nuclear fuel and give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Failure to do that had led the IAEA Board of Governors to find Iran in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement, and note that it had given rise to questions within the competence of the United Nations Security Council. Iran said it was in full compliance with its NPT obligations, and rejected demands that it give up any aspect of its peaceful nuclear program. It charged that the United States was in non-compliance with the NPT because it had concluded agreements to “transfer all kinds of nuclear technology” to NPT non- States Parties, especially Israel.

Vertical Proliferation
Vertical proliferation (the improvement of weapons design and effectiveness), was a cause of concern to a number of States. In that regard, speakers in the committee noted the weaponization of space, the continued qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons technology, and the technological cooperation of Nuclear Weapon States with non- States Parties to the NPT. South Africa, speaking for the New Agenda Coalition, said it was “disconcerting” that a NWS had “entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement with a State not Party to the NPT.” (In July 2005 the United States and India signed an agreement which would, after approval by the US Congress, lead to the removal of sanctions on the latter and accord it de facto status as an NPT Nuclear-Weapon-State.)

New Resolutions
There were several new resolutions in 2005: